Article Summary of "The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice" by Neil J. Kritz
Citation: Neil J. Kritz, "The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice," in Transitional Justice, Neil J. Kritz, ed. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995) pp. xix-xxx.
This Article Summary written by: Tanya Glaser, Conflict Research Consortium
Transitional justice deals with the problems faced by societies which are making the
transition from repressive regimes to more democratic orders. Such societies face a number
of dilemmas. The need to distinguish between the old regime and the new government
presents a first dilemma. Dealing swiftly and severely with members of the old regime does
sharply differentiate the new from the old. But it tends to undermine the democratic
principles which should differentiate the two. "Victor's justice" is often short
on due process. Adhering to democratic principles and the rule of law in dealing with the
former regime upholds the new government's basic principles. But since the wheels of
justice turn slowly, it may seem to leave the old regime unpunished, and injustices
unaddressed. The new government will not seem to have brought much change.
The new government must decide whether to punish the leaders and henchmen of the old
regime. Some argue that seeking justice and revealing the truth are the best ways to mark
the society's new beginning. Others argue that general amnesty is the best way to rebuild
and reconcile the state. The new order should let go of the past, and focus on the future.
Deciding to prosecute members of the old regime can be complicated. The statutes of
limitation may have expired on many crimes. Many of the "crimes" the new order
wishes to punish were actually legal under the old regime. The new order must also decide
who in the chain of command to prosecute; whether to prosecute the person who gave an
order or the underling who executed it. Should prosecution be limited to violations of
human rights, or extended to economic mismanagement? The new order must also decide what
punishments are appropriate. Here again they are caught between calls for revenge, the
need to distance themselves from the old regime, and the need to adhere to the new
democratic principles.
Despite calls for amnesty, the new order cannot afford to ignore the past. If the new
government does not publicize the misdeeds of the past, supporters of the old regime will
deny, evade and revise accounts of their days in power. They may undermine the new
government. The new order must also decide how to deal with the administrators, public
officials and bureaucrats who served under the old regime. The new government may be
tempted to purge members of the old regime from the public sector. The continued presence
of the old bureaucrats could make it seem that the new government is merely following the
old regime's "business as usual," and the old bureaucrats might in fact present
obstacles to reform. On the other hand, those personnel may be the only ones with the
knowledge needed to administer crucial public sector institutions. Purging the public
sector may violate the democratic principles of justice which reject collective
punishment, and demand the presumption of innocence.
The court system and judiciary can present a particularly acute dilemma. Commitment to
the rule of law demands that the courts be protected from political pressures. And so it
would seem inappropriate to replace old judges with new judges sympathetic to the new
politics. Yet the courts have generally played a key role in implementing and legitimizing
the policies of the repressive regimes. And so it would seem the judges are corrupt and
must be removed.
The new government must decide whether and what compensation to give the victims of the
former regime. Usually new governments are poor and their nations face weak economies. It
may seem that funds, if available at all, are better spent on rebuilding the state's
infrastructure. However, Kritz observes that compensation and restitution serve three
important functions. "First, it aids the victim's to manage the material aspect of
their loss. Second, it constitutes an official acknowledgment of their pain by the
nation...Third, it may deter the state from future abuses, by imposing a financial cost to
such misdeeds."[p. xxvii] International law increasingly acknowledges the state's
obligation to provide restitution.
The elements of transitional justice, trials and truth commissions, restitution and
rehabilitation are expensive in the short term. However, failing to deal adequately with
such issues will be even more expensive in the long term. Some funding may be gotten from
private or foreign sources. Others argue that the new government should bear the cost of
compensation. It reinforces the lesson that misdeeds are costly. The new government may
reclaim assets plundered by the former leaders. Kritz notes that "there is a certain
sense of justice and balance to recapturing these ill-gotten gains and applying them
directly to pay for other aspects of transitional justice."[p. xxix] When the new
order is also moving from a centralized to a market economy, issues of restitution and
redistribution take on additional importance and complexity.
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